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1Summary
The media in Tunisia has undergone drastic changes since the country’s 2011 
revolution. From content that was once uniform and restricted in the extreme, 
Tunisian media outlets have moved away from echoing the state line and are 
now providing diverse output. A host of new media outlets have cropped up. 
The legal framework and state institutions governing the industry are under-
going reform. And most importantly, journalists are now able to experience 
political journalism firsthand.
But though the groundwork is largely in place for a free and unbiased media 
landscape, journalists continue to operate without appropriate resources and 
training, and under questionable professional standards—dubious editorial 
qualities that are reflected in tabloid-style publications. As a reporter from 
Réalités magazine aptly described, after the fall of President Ben Ali, “we could 
finally say all we wanted, we could interview any political figure we wanted, 
we could even slam any of them. We were free.” Those journalists, so long 
prohibited from fully practicing their trade, remain unable to translate this 
acquired freedom into professional media practices. 
The Tunisian media is still a venue for manipulation, 
intimidation, and bias. Media outlets are becoming the 
main stage for the fierce political and ideological battle 
between the country’s opposing camps: conservative 
Islamists and secular elitists. Ennahda, the Islamist win-
ner of the first free elections in the history of this deeply 
secular country, gradually awakened to the ongoing influence of the national 
media and turned to old regime tactics. The Islamist party and its supporters 
are raising their voices against what they view as the “leftist lobbies” that are 
turning the media into a weapon against government policies. 
The true liberalization of the media sector will be impossible without the 
training that instills professional standards in the industry and helps members 
of the Tunisian media overcome entrenched habits. Guaranteeing journalists 
a degree of job security must also be a priority. As long as working conditions 
remain a concern and journalists are unable to secure decent contracts with 
reasonable stability and salaries, the quality of content will not be a priority.
The Tunisian media is still a venue for 
manipulation, intimidation, and bias. 

3Transforming the Tunisian Media
Print and broadcast media in Tunisia turned the page on a new chapter after 
the country’s 2011 uprising and the demise of the Ben Ali regime, freed as 
they were from the heavy hand and strict control of their former rulers. Yet, 
the uprising also plunged them into a period of uncertainty about what exactly 
to do with their newfound freedom. Today, Tunisian journalism remains at 
best a work in progress. 
Members of the media are still not totally free in Tunisia. The boundaries 
of what is and is not permissible are certainly not as narrow as they used to be, 
but they are not clear either. The country still lacks a cadre 
of professional journalists, and writers recently freed from 
strict controls have not necessarily absorbed the ethics and 
professional practices that ensure a high quality of report-
ing. Working conditions also remain poor, with many 
journalists living on temporary work contracts that may 
be renewed for long periods but without any security of 
tenure. Most importantly, the Tunisian mainstream media 
is becoming a central feature of the political struggle 
between the new government led by moderate Islamists 
and the new secular opposition. 
The difficulty of transforming the Tunisian media from a closely controlled 
tool of the regime to the free voice of a democratic society provides a strong 
reminder that the transition from authoritarianism, in Tunisia and elsewhere, 
requires not just regime change at the top but changes in all the regime’s 
institutions. These battles for reform may receive much less attention than the 
battles taking place at the highest levels of government, but they are just as 
important to the outcome of the transition process.
The Industry’s Past 
The Tunisian media was once among the most monotone and heavily cen-
sored in the Arab world, governed by a system of vicious and rigorous controls 
over both independent and state-run outlets. The industry was renowned for 
being micromanaged and under the thumb of a number of governmental bod-
ies with a monopoly on all aspects of media operations. Taking a “carrot and 
stick” approach to media outlets, the previous regime rewarded those who 
praised it and sanctioned those who dared criticize it.
The Tunisian mainstream media is 
becoming a central feature of the 
political struggle between the new 
government led by moderate Islamists 
and the new secular opposition.
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Before the uprising, print media was divided between publications directly 
owned by the state (La Presse, Essahafa) or the ruling party (Al-Hurriya, Le 
Renouveau) and those that were privately owned but retained firm ties to the 
regime through friendship, family, or the de facto nepotism of the industry 
(Assabah, Al-Chourouk, Le Temps, Le Quotidien, Assarih). Meanwhile, the former 
opposition press (Al-Mouatinoun, Al-Fajr, Al-Tariq al-Jadid ) subsisted with dif-
ficulty under political and economic pressure from the regime. 
The broadcast sector was dominated by two large state television chan-
nels whose role was to report on the activities of the president and his family 
(Wataniya 1 and Wataniya 2). In the regime’s last decade, the channels’ subject 
matter became the broader “clan” and not just the president himself. In addi-
tion to these large broadcasters, two private television channels and twelve 
radio stations existed, two of which belonged to the state. Two large private 
television channels with links to the Ben Ali clan (Hannibal TV and Nessma 
TV) operated throughout the country but could not be described as inde-
pendent. All private broadcast media outlets were officially prohibited from 
reporting on politics—that remained the domain of the state-run media, for 
whom political reporting amounted to a daily recital of the news bulletin from 
the president’s family. 
A host of state institutions worked behind the scenes to regulate the system. 
The Ministry of Communications held overall responsibility for the Tunisian 
media, and the Ministry of Interior was responsible for approving the appli-
cations of new print publications. It transformed that process, which should 
have just consisted of a simple notification, into a disguised licensing system. 
Central to much of this was the Agency for External Communication. Part 
of the Ministry of Communications, the agency was created in 1990 with the 
primary task of embellishing the image of the regime in the international 
media. However, the agency was also ultimately responsible for distributing 
advertising revenue from public administrations to the various media outlets, 
thereby determining their funding and viability. 
On an international level, the Agency for External Communication’s main 
function was to encourage the publication of implicitly pro-regime propa-
ganda by sponsoring journalistic trips to Tunisia or even paying direct remu-
nerations for articles endorsing the regime. In a bid to foster the image of 
a reformist regime, the agency’s fierce international campaign targeted not 
only media professionals but also diplomats and politicians. One of the most 
prominent beneficiaries of these trips was the former French minister of for-
eign and European affairs, Michèle Alliot-Marie. She was forced to step down 
after the French press published the news of her Christmas holiday to Tunisia, 
during which she was flown around on a jet by Aziz Miled, who is close to 
the Ben Ali family, while the revolution was raging. The agency also handled 
important operational tasks, such as granting permits for special envoys and 
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international correspondents, and had license to withdraw the permits of any 
journalists critical of regime policies. 
The Tunisian Internet Agency, meanwhile, policed online content, censor-
ing and monitoring Internet users by blocking pages containing “unaccept-
able” content—primarily of a political nature. A company owned by Masoud 
Dada, a close associate of the former regime, monopolized the distribution 
operations of all newspapers and magazines (and it is still functioning as 
the sole distributor of publications in the region of Tunis). Management of 
radio and television signal distribution was the jurisdiction of the National 
Broadcasting Corporation or Office National de Télédiffusion (ONT). That 
authority imposed state control in part by restricting access to the frequencies 
that enabled transmissions of broadcast content. 
 In light of these restrictions, as well as extremely sen-
sitive working conditions, local journalists were chiefly 
concerned with trying to avoid breaching so-called red-
lines. As many journalists I interviewed explained,1 the 
quality of media output was seldom a priority given the 
many greater hazards of their professional situation and 
their fragile job security. In fact, the system of media con-
trol enforced by the regime transformed local journalists 
into mere communicators of government policy. 
Only local media staff working for international outlets enjoyed some 
degree of freedom of expression, while remaining vigilant about crossing the 
editorial redlines set by the regime. This freedom was the most limited when 
it came to examining the internal affairs of the Ben Ali family and subjects 
related to corruption, wealth disparity, and poverty. According to former BBC 
Arabic correspondent Kamal Ben Younes, his “secret recipe” for averting offi-
cial anger while still managing to address controversial topics was to trans-
mit sensitive information to colleagues at the BBC’s headquarters in London. 
Provided this information was not reported directly by the local Tunisian cor-
respondent, his position was generally uncompromised. 
The Tunisian media did witness a number of brief “awakenings” before 
the revolution, but they were mainly the result of a political desire to open 
up the industry in order to ease economic tensions and convey a more flat-
tering or reformist image of the regime. Consequently, the years 1977–1988 
saw a “Tunisian press spring,” reflected in the outbreak of a number of pio-
neering independent publications. Ben Ali’s ascent to power brought another 
short “spring” to the country’s media (1988–1990), though this quickly turned 
to repression once again as measures such as prior censorship of the press 
were implemented for the first time. Under that policy, print publications were 
forced to deliver copies to the Ministry of Information for content control 
prior to distribution. This drastic measure was lifted later and replaced with 
explicit directives to the editors of these publications. 
The system of media control enforced by 
the regime transformed local journalists into 
mere communicators of government policy. 
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The New System
After the fall of the Ben Ali regime, a long-repressed and eager appetite for 
publishing was unleashed and brought chaos to the previously rigidly regulated 
industry. According to the National Authority for the Reform of Information 
and Communication (INRIC), the body that was tasked with overseeing the 
reform of the media after the revolution, in total, 228 new Tunisian print 
publications sprang up after the uprising. Most of them, however, are not cur-
rently in operation, with many vanishing soon after being launched. 
In the first few months after the revolution, all media outlets, including 
those that published under the former regime, were quickly transformed into 
platforms for personal and political account-settling. The lack of experience 
among local journalists, who had long served as simple conduits for regime 
propaganda, as well as the absence of any ethical codes of conduct, left those 
in the media industry ill-equipped to translate their new freedom into pro-
fessional practices. Most frequently, a new interest in investigative and field 
reporting manifested itself in an errant pursuit of sensationalism. Some of the 
new publications still in existence operate under extremely basic conditions 
with few journalists on staff and questionable professional standards—dubi-
ous editorial qualities that are reflected in tabloid-style publications.
The state-run press and the media owned by the former ruling party 
and the Ben Ali family were restructured. Before the election of the new 
Constituent Assembly in October 2011, the interim government made changes 
to the administrations of some state-run media, a process that is considered 
by many as incomplete, as some leading figures who were prominent under 
the former regime are still controlling the decisionmaking processes in these 
outlets. Press outlets formerly owned by the ruling party—al Hurriya and 
Le Renouveau—were shut down and their staffs merged into the state-run 
media. Those outlets that once belonged to the Ben Ali family, meanwhile, 
were confiscated by the prime minister’s office with “judicial administrators” 
nominated to oversee their new management. 
The public broadcasting scene now includes two television channels—
Wataniya 1 and Wataniya 2—and nine radio stations, of which four are 
national (Radio Tunis in Arabic, Radio Tunis International, Culture Radio, 
and Youth Radio) and five are regional (Sfax, Monastir, Gafsa, Le Kef, and 
Tataouine)—the latter being a contrast to the former media landscape where 
outlets were centralized in the capital. Radio Shems FM, formerly the prop-
erty of the ousted president’s daughter, Cyrine Ben Ali, and the religious Radio 
Zeitouna, owned by Ben Ali’s son-in-law, Sakher El Matri, are now included in 
the post-revolution public media landscape. 
 Most of the government institutions that used to manage the media indus-
try are evolving or closing down, no longer assuming their repressive func-
tions. Still, how they will be reorganized and rebranded in a modern context 
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remains unclear. For instance, the Ministry of Communications was shut 
down after the revolution, but the functions of that institution did not entirely 
disappear. After the October election, a special committee was formed at the 
office of the prime minister to manage relations with the national and inter-
national media. Licenses are no longer granted by the Ministry of Interior; 
new press publications are asked to present a file to the Ministry of Justice 
that contains basic information about the new project and they are no longer 
obligated to have the approval from authorities for being allowed to publish. 
Although the Agency for External Communication is being questioned 
over the misuse of public funds—as outlined in the report of the fact-finding 
committee that in the wake of the revolution was tasked with investigating 
corruption under the former regime—it is still the main entity responsible for 
granting accreditations to foreign correspondents. Since February 2011, the 
agency has also been under the authority of a judicial administrator, although 
the interim government declared its willingness to dismantle the body.2 The 
Tunisian Internet Agency is modernizing, rebranding itself as a provider of 
services. According to its CEO Moez Chakchouk, the agency is now “deter-
mined to promote the openness and neutrality of the Internet.”3 However, the 
threat of web filtering still looms. 
A Thorny Legal Liberalization Process
The legal reform of the Tunisian media industry was launched after the Ben 
Ali regime was ousted. While they were primarily focused on abolishing the 
repressive features of laws governing the media, the reforms generated a new 
vision for a liberalized and professional industry inspired by other interna-
tional models and transitional experiences. However, the process, which cul-
minated in legal decrees that guaranteed openness in the media, is yet to be 
enforced by the new government. 
Laws Governing Journalism Under Ben Ali
Under the former Tunisian regime, the country’s media was regulated by an 
arsenal of laws in both the press and criminal codes. Governing the print 
media was the 1975 Press Code (Law 32–1975), which underwent a number 
of amendments in the years 1988, 1993, 2001, and 2006. Rather than allowing 
greater freedom, those reforms aimed to accentuate political control over the 
media. Under the Press Code, several physical and financial penalties were 
imposed on journalists found to be in breach of the state’s redlines, which 
included the protection of “internal and external state security” and “public 
order.” The penalties were applied arbitrarily by the Ministry of Interior, which 
interpreted the document’s vague wording in a way that completely muzzled 
the media. Similarly, the code prescribed prison sentences for journalists that 
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committed any of twelve different offenses—for example, incitement to mur-
der, religious and racial hatred, denigration of the Tunisian president and for-
eign state presidents, misinformation, and libel and slander. The length of 
defamation sentences depended on the official status of the defamed. 
Under the rule of Ben Ali, some criminal sentences were shifted from the 
jurisdiction of the Press Code to the Penal Code. Prison terms were imposed 
for “defamatory” speech in cases relating to public officials, the president, 
state institutions such as the judiciary and armed forces, foreign heads of state 
and foreign diplomats, and religious groups. Through broad wording that 
facilitated misuse, these provisions were regularly used by the former regime 
to preempt public criticism, gag journalists, and jail dissidents and human 
rights activists. 
By contrast, there was no unified law regulating the broadcast media’s 
various private and state-run outlets. The only existing legal framework was 
related to the establishment of public institutions, such as Law 49 of 1990, 
which governed the establishment of Tunisia’s public radio and television cor-
poration, and the laws establishing the National Broadcasting Corporation of 
Tunisia (Law 93–8, 1993)4 as well as the National Frequencies Agency (Law 
2001–1).5 In the absence of any wide-ranging broadcast laws, the industry was 
subject to financial and political control by the regime, as enforced by the 
Ministry of Communications, which presided over media content, staffing, 
and editorial decisions. 
A New Vision for the Industry
Following the revolution, the National Authority for Reform of Information 
and Communications refused to play any executive role, opting instead for a 
nonstatutory function. Composed of media professionals and legal experts and 
led by an experienced Tunisian journalist,6 the new authority worked under 
the remit of the High Authority for the Achievement of the Revolutionary 
Objectives (Haute instance pour la réalisation des objectifs de la révolution, 
de la réforme politique et de la transition démocratique). The latter body was 
tasked with laying the foundations for the new republic—a function that was 
terminated in October 2011 when the Constituent Assembly was elected.
INRIC was tasked with “proposing reforms for the information and commu-
nication sectors with consideration of international criteria on freedom of expres-
sion.”7 Its role was primarily consultative, centered on implementing reforms by 
drafting laws in collaboration with a committee of legal experts. Through a series 
of workshops involving local and international media experts as well as media 
advocacy groups, the body’s consultative role resulted in a final report presenting 
its main recommendations for the liberalization of the industry.8 
Its new vision for reforming the Tunisian media focused on dismantling 
the old system in favor of new structures modeled on international precedents. 
Central to this was the transformation of the state-run media into a provider of 
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public services—a goal that was widely criticized in light of the state media’s 
former deleterious role in serving the regime and its lack of basic professional 
standards. As the head of INRIC Kamel Labidi argues, the state-run media sec-
tor “can provide an example of better practices for private media. Public opinion 
prefers to rely on public institutions that can provide high professional stan-
dards. Private media was not more professional under the former regime and 
was sometimes used for spin and defamation against activists and journalists.”9
Now nearing the end of its stated mission, INRIC has to date worked to 
issue three essential decrees aimed at reforming the media sector and guaran-
teeing essential journalistic rights. However, because the body operated during 
the interim phase of the transition, it lacked statutory power. The measures it 
decided upon thus need to be enforced by the new government. INRIC has 
been criticized for the inefficiency this produced. Most of its decrees, issued 
under the interim government prior to the election of the new Constituent 
Assembly, have not yet been approved and ratified by the assembly and so have 
not entered into official legal force. The reluctance of the new government, 
which is led by the Islamist Ennahda party and took power in December 2011, 
to endorse the majority of the reforms has raised questions about the efficacy 
of INRIC and its legacy. 
Promising Changes
Drafted to replace the former Press Code, the recent Decree 115–2011 (of 
November 2, 2011) sets out to guarantee “freedom of exchanging, publishing 
and receiving news and views of all kinds.”10 The decree ensures basic media 
rights, such as journalists’ access to information, the confidentiality of sources, 
and journalists’ protection against physical or economic threats as a result of 
exercising these rights, expressing opinions, or disseminating information. The 
document also sets out a number of organizational provisions in relation to the 
press. It allows freedom of publication without prior license for print outlets, 
includes articles requiring the nomination of an editor responsible for output 
and the clear separation of commercial and editorial teams, and imposes trans-
parency with respect to outlets’ funding, ownership, editorial management, and 
circulation. The decree also tackles the question of media diversity through 
anti-monopoly stipulations, for example prohibiting any single individual from 
owning two political publications that exceed 30 percent of the overall daily 
circulation of similar publications at the national level.
Most importantly, limits are placed on the ability of the Ministry of Interior 
to intervene in the industry. The judiciary currently oversees the industry, 
including the process of new print publication registration, which is now an 
automated notification system run by the judiciary. The majority of prison 
sentences, including those for defamation and slander, have been abolished 
in favor of fines, with imprisonment reserved for a very limited number 
of offenses. Among those offenses are endorsing terrorism or war crimes, 
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incitement to religious or racial hatred, disseminating 
ideas about racial discrimination, and publishing informa-
tion related to legal cases of rape against minors. However, 
the media community, along with advocacy and lobbying 
groups, has continued calls for the wholesale abolition of 
prison sentences for journalists. 
A second new decree, number 41–2011 (dated May 26, 
2011), aims to regulate the disclosure of government doc-
uments for use by journalists. Access to such documents had been restricted, 
which was one of the main grievances of journalists under the Ben Ali regime. 
In essence, the restriction was a de facto ban on investigative journalism. The 
new decree, by contrast, obliges governmental bodies to facilitate access by 
journalists and the public. If a public administration refuses to disclose docu-
ments, it can be sued and held accountable.11
A third decree, number 116–2011 (dated November 2, 2011), guaran-
tees freedom in the broadcast sector and establishes an independent com-
munications authority—the High Independent Authority for Audiovisual 
Communication or HAICA—tasked with regulating the industry.12 That free-
dom is not without its limits. Privacy is guaranteed with respect to religious 
practice, the protection of children, and public health. And the same restric-
tions on the “protection of public order” and “national security” used by for-
mer regime remain enshrined in the new provisions without explicit references 
to their application. The legislative authority has argued that these restric-
tions are a standard component of media laws in most democratic systems. 
HAICA, which is yet to be formally established, will be composed of: 
• A member appointed by the Tunisian president who presides over the 
body
• Two members representing the judiciary, elected by the representative 
Union of Judges
• Two members appointed by the speaker of the Constituent Assembly
• Two members proposed by the Union of Journalists
• A member appointed by representatives of the broadcast sector (from 
the technical field) 
According to the decree establishing this commission, anyone who has held 
political or governmental posts in the past two years is barred from member-
ship. Unlike INRIC, HAICA is a statutory body with executive powers. The 
independent authority has regulatory, consultative, and judicial powers, includ-
ing the ability to approve or reject applications for new operating licenses, to 
produce license specifications (cahiers de charge) for public broadcasting out-
lets, and to preserve plurality in output, especially in political programs. A 
key example is the commission’s authority to oversee broadcast coverage of 
The media community, along with 
advocacy and lobbying groups, has 
continued calls for the wholesale abolition 
of prison sentences for journalists. 
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electoral campaigns by allotting air time for each candidate and scheduling 
the coverage.
HAICA is empowered to adopt a code of ethics and conduct for the broad-
cast of advertisements and to settle disputes related to the launch and opera-
tions of television and radio stations. Significantly, it may also sanction offenses 
committed by media outlets with penalties ranging from infringement notices 
to fines and ultimately to the suspension or even withdrawal of operating 
licenses. The authority provides recommendations for the development of the 
sector, with particular respect to its regulation, and it has a binding say in all 
related law proposals as well as in the nomination of the directors of state-run 
radio and television outlets. Most importantly, HAICA is regarded as a tribu-
nal of first instance because its decisions on matters relating to sanctions can 
be appealed before courts in the judicial system. 
Criticism of the New System
The powers invested in this new body have sparked criticism from within the 
media community, especially among owners of media outlets who consider 
such wide-ranging powers as the ability to suspend licenses significant threats 
to media freedom. INRIC has in turn responded with the claim that broadcast 
media laws in democratic systems include similar provisions. 
The reasons behind delaying the establishment of HAICA have not been 
openly stated. But these criticisms, combined with the perceived mistrust that 
exists between INRIC and the new government, are said to be behind the 
government’s current reluctance to endorse Decrees 115 and 116 (Decree 41 
has been endorsed) and establish a formal regulatory body for the broadcast 
sector. The new opposition has described the delay as a tactical maneuver to 
retain control over the broadcast industry.13 
Soon, INRIC will end its mission and its functions will be assumed by a 
new, yet-to-be-established body overseeing the broadcast industry—HAICA. 
Instead of replacing INRIC with a regulatory body for print media, INRIC 
advocates self-regulation for the industry and the adoption of a code of eth-
ics to guide the practices of journalists, modeled on international precedents. 
INRIC’s legacy, however, is not clear. The current government launched a 
national consultation process on the content of the new decrees issued for the 
print and broadcast sectors. However, the process was boycotted by both INRIC 
and the National Union for Journalists on the grounds that the procedure was 
flawed and retained links to the former regime. In the event that the consulta-
tion process fails, Decrees 115 and 116 must be submitted to the Constituent 
Assembly, which is empowered to adopt, amend, or reject its provisions.
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Intimidation Persists
The incomplete legal liberalization of Tunisia’s media sector has not brought 
an end to the prosecution of journalists for practicing their profession. Rather, 
journalists now fear that the judicial system, not the Ministry of the Interior, 
will be used as a key tool of intimidation. And those fears do not appear 
unfounded given a number of recent incidents in which journalists were sen-
tenced to prison terms under the provisions of the Penal Code, casting doubt 
on the efficacy of the reform process. However, rulings by the judiciary in 
several similar cases reveal a reluctance to issue prison sentences, with judges 
instead choosing to apply a “soft” approach and using the Penal Code to sanc-
tion journalists. 
According to Bechir Ourda, a former journalist and adviser to INRIC, the 
judicial system is now in a “legal limbo” with respect to practices relating to 
journalists, as the system applies both the provisions of the new Press Code 
(Decree 115–2011) as well as the Penal Code. However, the new Press Code 
stipulates that its provisions should replace all preexisting laws addressing 
media-related issues. “All previous legal provisions applied before the prom-
ulgation of the Decree 115 are de facto abolished,” explains Ourda, “This 
includes the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with offenses committed 
by media professionals.”14 And in some cases the judiciary does indeed use 
the Press Code. Ourda cites the example of journalist Chaker Besbes of Radio 
Mosaic, who received a fine for filming inside a courtroom without prior per-
mission from the judge. In this instance, the court chose to apply the new 
Press Code, limiting its ruling to a small penalty fine.15 
Still, calls to lift provisions in the Penal Code that require sending journal-
ists to prison and to decriminalize offenses such as defamation continue to 
be ignored.16 The reluctance of Tunisia’s post-revolution political powers to 
endorse new decrees regulating media is regarded as the main factor behind 
the judiciary’s resort to the Penal Code in cases targeting journalists. “They 
are under political pressure from the new regime,” says Ourda. 
The majority of post-revolution legal suits against journalists have been 
brought on religious grounds—that is, the journalists are accused of violating 
Islamic values—and are simultaneously presented as charges of disturbing 
public order. The first application of the Penal Code provisions to journalists 
in the post–Ben Ali era involved the imprisonment of an editor for publishing 
a photograph of a nude woman on the front page of his newspaper. The gen-
eral director of the Attounissiya newspaper, Nasreddine Ben Saida, was released 
after a week of pre-trial detention on charges of offenses against “public 
morality” for printing the photo, which shows a Tunisian-German soccer star 
and his girlfriend, his arm covering her bare chest. Authorities seized all cop-
ies of the offending edition after it was distributed to newsstands. The arrest 
of Ben Saida, as well as two members of his editorial team, was conducted in 
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accordance with Article 121(3) of the Penal Code, under which the director 
could also face a prison term of up to five years and a fine of up to 1,200 dinars 
($801) if convicted.17 
The same approach was used against Nabil Karoui, the director general of 
the privately owned Nessma TV station, and two of his employees. They were 
accused of “violating sacred values” and “disturbing public order” for airing 
the French-Iranian film Persepolis. In one scene, the film’s main character is 
shown talking to God, which sparked outrage among Tunisian conservative 
Muslims. The lawsuit, which was filed by more than 140 lawyers, accused the 
head of the channel of complicity in airing a foreign film that would dis-
turb public order and undermine public morality. Karoui was eventually fined 
around $1,500 with the court reluctant to impose the maximum sentence of 
three years’ imprisonment demanded by ultra-conservatives. A sign that some 
progress has been made in this area since the fall of the former regime, the 
court’s ruling communicated clearly that the judiciary would be reluctant to 
apply drastic sentences that may further encourage claims against journalists.18
 A number of similar cases have been brought against journalists and media 
outlets on the same religious grounds. Among these is the case of two young 
Tunisian bloggers who were sentenced to seven years in prison for posting 
cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad on Facebook. The two bloggers from 
the coastal town of Mahdia were charged with the “violation of morality, and 
disturbing public order.” They are at present appealing the sentence. 
These trends apply to the broader cyber realm as well. Although the 
Tunisian Internet Agency is striving to evolve away from its former repressive 
role in the surveillance of cyberspace, it may be compelled to adopt its previ-
ous filtering practices following a recent initiative in which a group of lawyers 
obtained a court order forcing the agency to block pornographic sites that 
allegedly posed a threat to minors and Muslim values. The ruling was upheld 
in its first court appeal. Ultimately, the judgment was overturned by the Court 
of Cassation, Tunisia’s highest court, but no final ruling was made. The court 
opted instead to refer the case back to appeal, leaving the 
threat of Internet filtering firmly in place.19
These kinds of cases are not new to Tunisia. The Penal 
Code was frequently employed under the Ben Ali regime 
to prosecute journalists, with an important set of criminal 
sentences for journalists moved from the Press Code to 
the Penal Code in the final years of his rule. Not only 
do these current cases raise questions about protecting 
freedom of expression during the country’s transitional 
period, but they also reflect the struggle between secular-
ists and Islamists that is turning the mainstream media 
into one of the country’s most prominent battlefields. 
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The stance of the Islamists from Ennahda, the winner of the first free elec-
tions in the history of this deeply secular country, is still evolving. The major-
ity of these cases have been initiated by lawyers claiming to safeguard what are 
deemed “Muslim values,” and the government has often shown itself intoler-
ant of views that are considered anti-Islamic. But the government remains 
reluctant to take measures against extremist views when those views are in line 
with radical Salafi Islam, such as those advocating brutality against “infidels” 
or the legalization of female genital mutilation (which Egyptian cleric Wajdi 
Ghouneim advocated during his visit to Tunisia). This is sparking accusa-
tions from the secular camp that the Ennahda-led government is perpetuating 
double standards when it comes to issues of freedom of expression.20 
Ideological Battles and Independence 
in the Mainstream Media
Overall, the margin for freedom of expression in the mainstream Tunisian 
media has improved relative to the situation before the revolution. However, 
media outlets are becoming the main stage for the fierce political and ideologi-
cal battle between the country’s opposing camps: conser-
vative Islamists and secular elitists. The partisan alignment 
of journalists between these two camps has transformed 
the mainstream media into a platform for propaganda, 
with media professionals once again in thrall to political 
agendas. As a result, the opportunity for local journalists 
to independently become more professional could again 
be sacrificed in the service of ideology.
Ennahda Islamists had not planned a media campaign for the election. From 
the perspective of the party, long known for its struggle against the regime and 
its roots in conservative anti-Francophile Tunisia, the electoral battle was not 
to be won in media outlets but through coordinated and efficient action on the 
ground. If the pro-secular media were to negatively focus on the dangers of 
Islamization, it would be counterproductive in Ennahda’s eyes. 
Yet, a campaign launched by Nessma warned of an Iran-style Islamic 
republic and culminated in the airing of Persepolis and a debate on political 
Islam. The campaign was viewed by many as an effective tool for boosting the 
popularity of the Islamist party—the Islamists appeared to be the victims of 
a campaign launched by the secularists. However, this thesis was rejected by 
one of the channel’s anchors as simplistic. According to Sofian Ben Hamida, 
chief of news at the channel, the new Islamist reality of the Arab world is over-
looked by secularists. “In all Arab transitional regimes, Islamists are scoring 
high in elections,” he says. “We have the tradition of broadcasting films that 
tackle a theme with a debate. The Iranian film was not an exception. In our 
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Arab region, modernity is just a façade rooted in an Islamist reality; we refuse 
to see this reality.”21 
Ennahda’s previous indifference to the impact of the press is now a thing of 
the past. Awakened to the ongoing influence of the national media, in particu-
lar state-run and private television channels, the Islamist party and its support-
ers are raising their voices against what they view as the “leftist lobbies” that 
are turning the media into a weapon against government 
policies. Considering state media a vocal platform for 
the opposition, Tunisia’s new rulers are stepping up their 
attack on these outlets and their management. Ennahda 
alleges that state media exaggerates the government’s defi-
ciencies in an attempt to bring the ruling tripartite coali-
tion to its knees. In contrast to the role of mosques, some 
of which are said to be completely under the control of 
radical Salafi groups, national mainstream media is viewed as a spearhead in 
the battle to preserve the secular state against the grassroots Islamization of 
the country. The national state-run television station, accused by Ennahda’s 
supporters of being the new mouthpiece of the secular opposition, is central 
to this struggle. 
State-run television channels are controlled by “hidden lobbies,” according 
to Adel Thabti, editor in chief of Al-Mouatinoun magazine published by the 
Ettakatol party, which is part of the ruling coalition. He expressed disappoint-
ment in the quality of state-run channels, claiming that they fail to give equal 
representation to a diversity of views, especially on topics that drive a wedge 
between the government and opposition. According to Thabti, state-run tele-
vision declined to invite representatives of Salafi groups to explain their posi-
tion on the issue of wearing the niqab in universities, which was forbidden 
under the former secular regime. This issue is fueling tensions between secu-
larists and Salafi groups who are claiming the right for veiled women to access 
university campuses. 
Tunisia’s state television is theoretically under the control of the new gov-
ernment. However, its editorial line does not always appear to reflect gov-
ernment’s policies, and it remains unclear how its new editorial direction is 
determined. State television headquarters recently became the site of a sit-
in by Ennahda supporters, demanding the “purification” of the outlet from 
so-called “agents” of the former regime and foreign colonial interference. 
“The people want to change the media” is becoming a popular slogan among 
Ennahda supporters. 
Meanwhile, the government’s decision to nominate new senior officials to 
state-media management positions, a task that should be the prerogative of the 
new broadcast industry regulatory body (HAICA), fueled claims that the gov-
ernment was resorting to old regime tactics. Such grievances were aggravated 
by the fact that some of the nominees were senior media figures from the Ben 
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Ali regime itself. The government was forced to back off the move following 
a vocal campaign by the opposition, supported by large elements of the media 
community, who claimed the nominations were an attempt to “intimidate” 
and ultimately silence the media under the new regime.22 These nominations 
were denounced by INRIC as tantamount to “total control by the government 
of the state media and an alienation of its independence and the autonomy of 
its decisions.”23
More recently, the battle over the control of state tele-
vision stations has shifted from the streets to the courts. 
Unable to control the channels’ output, Islamists have 
resorted to the judiciary to step up pressure on the sta-
tions’ editorial line. A recent legal case against the Tunisian 
public television network sought to prohibit the use of 
the term “interim” to describe the new government. The 
term, the Islamists argued, made the government appear less legitimate, and 
the case symbolized the current feud over control of state-media editorial poli-
cies. In this case, the judiciary ultimately ruled in favor of state television.24 
New Journalism in Practice
The media is clearly still under the thumb of a number of players. As has 
implicitly been admitted by secularists and Islamists, evolving toward inde-
pendent journalism remains the main challenge for mainstream media profes-
sionals who have not yet been able to envisage a role for themselves beyond 
serving a political agenda. The election of the Constituent Assembly was a 
litmus test for Tunisian media in political journalism. The task of reporting 
this momentous event revealed the many professional challenges that still 
confront a national media industry under development. The National Union 
of Tunisian Journalists, which set up a press ethics observatory to monitor 
election coverage, found that there had been “a qualitative transformation in 
print, broadcast and new media since the revolution.”25 The monitoring report 
commended efforts at impartiality in the coverage of the electoral campaign 
as well as further steps toward professionalism. 
The report, however, criticized the bias of some media outlets toward cer-
tain political parties and the editorial U-turn some publications made—rapidly 
switching from a glorification of the regime before Ben Ali’s fall to scath-
ing criticism of it. It also highlighted an emergence of “sensationalism, exag-
geration, excesses and tension, which has resulted in entrenching, especially 
amongst the public media, hackneyed phrases and stereotypical formulas.”26
The challenge of delivering high-quality, impartial, and professional 
reporting of the elections was hampered by journalists’ lack of experience and 
the short timeframe for preparations and training. Further challenges were 
posed by the vast number of candidates, most of whom were unknown to the 
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Tunisian public and media community. Amid all of these obstacles and the 
fierce battle between secularists and Islamists, providing each party fair rep-
resentation was not a priority for journalists, who were also operating without 
any clear guidance from above—editors have the same (lack of) experience 
as the reporters.
For Khaled Hadda, deputy editor of Al-Chourouk newspaper, renowned as 
a powerful platform under the former regime, it seemed customary to grant 
a significant share of its election coverage to Ennahda. The “Ennahda party 
was organizing large public activities. We did not give them visibility, they 
were visible,” he says. “I cannot give visibility to a party which is not popular. I 
cannot fabricate a public opinion which did not really exist. In the past we did 
not have the choice. Now, we have it.”27 For Nessma TV’s Sofian Ben Hamida, 
the major concern was not to represent diverse opinions, but to reflect the 
identity of his television channel, which Ennahda supporters consider a radi-
cal voice for the secular opposition. “During the elections, we decided that we 
will be ourselves, without any censorship and without denying our values,” he 
explains. “We are a modern secular channel and we don’t think that we should 
be ashamed of it.”28
Tunisia’s New Mainstream Journalists 
Major steps have been taken toward diversifying and liberalizing the country’s 
media sector; however, a number of interrelated factors continue to pose chal-
lenges to Tunisian journalism. Foremost among these is journalistic indepen-
dence from those in political power and media profession-
als’ awareness of their role in questioning and not flattering 
the authorities. Progress toward impartial reporting can 
pave the way for a real reconciliation between journalists 
and their audiences. The fragile working conditions of the 
local media community, however, represent a major obsta-
cle to professionalism. 
A “rehabilitation” process, as described by some of the mainstream Tunisian 
journalists interviewed, has recently begun to help Tunisian society move on 
from what audiences once called the “reporters of the clan.” This is a thorny 
process that requires self-criticism and wholesale revision of the mechanisms 
that led the media industry to assume the function of regime mouthpiece. 
The simplistic “I had no choice” attitude remains prevalent and was the clear 
and consistent response from journalists I interviewed. When they were ques-
tioned about their personal and professional responsibilities, they claimed, 
“we did not have a choice, we had to save our jobs.” 
For the majority of mainstream journalists, serving the regime was inevi-
table, as employees were compelled to abide by the policy of media institu-
tions. Tibr al Nouaimi worked as a reporter for the Al-Hurriya daily, which 
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represented the former ruling party and was abruptly closed the day Ben Ali 
left the country. She claims to be “proud” of having served “the newspaper set 
by Bourguiba.”29 Tibr, who joined the team of Shabab public radio after the 
closure of the newspaper, refuses to discuss her personal responsibility or to 
acknowledge any guilt for promoting the former regime. “We were honest as 
we used to report the events as they happened,” she says. “But we were only 
reporting events that supported the policy of the party. This was the policy of 
the paper. As one of its journalists, I had to respect it. I was doing a profes-
sional job.”30
This attitude of denial is typical of Tunisia’s editors and leading media fig-
ures, most of whom opted to follow the current trends and simply shift from 
praising the former regime to flattering the new government. The reaction of 
the editorial board of Réalités magazine to journalists’ proposal to apologize 
to their readers is a good example of the tendency to look the other way. As 
one of the magazine’s journalists, Hanene Zbiss, recounts: “On 30 December 
[2010], while the country was burning, we published a paid-for article praising 
the achievements of one of the family members of Ben Ali. This was a major 
setback for us. After the revolution, we had several meetings with the manage-
ment asking to publish a letter of apology to our readers. The answer was a 
complete denial: but what could we do?”31
The debate about journalistic responsibility has sparked controversy over 
a blacklist of media figures who played a prominent role in misleading the 
media community and distorting public opinion under the former regime. 
The proposal, which is backed by the journalists’ union, aims to open the 
door to legal suits against these media figures. However, it is far from being 
accepted by all journalists. Many opponents of the blacklist are concerned 
about unleashing a vendetta among journalists, particularly in light of the 
chaos of accusations and libel that exploded in Tunisia’s media in the first 
months after the revolution. Then, journalists accused each other of being 
agents of the former regime and accused public figures of being corrupt, for 
instance. Others believe that a genuine reconciliation requires amending past 
mistakes and letting those who committed them assume responsibility.
Old Practices Die Hard
While the transitional media scene is witnessing a wider margin for free-
dom of expression, entrenched habits of praising rulers mean that the dan-
ger of new forms of media clientelism has not vanished. While some editors, 
especially those responsible for decisionmaking in the state-run media, have 
been removed, others have retained powerful positions or have even been 
promoted since the revolution. Meanwhile, change is virtually impossible in 
the upper echelons of decisionmaking in the private media, where editors are 
often also the owners of media outlets. In some of these, editorial teams have 
Fatima el-Issawi | 19
managed to establish a line between the editorial decisionmaking and owner-
ship, requesting that editors be elected by journalistic staff. 
This fragile process of editorial independence has not been realized in 
other media outlets where decisionmaking processes remain largely unaltered. 
As Rafic Ben Abdallah, the parliamentary reporter from Assabah newspaper, 
explains: “After the revolution, we told the Editor ‘Degage’ [“Leave,” the slo-
gan of the Tunisian revolution], we were fighting for the decisionmaking pro-
cess inside the newspaper to be governed by consensual figures who did not 
play a negative role under the old regime. Unfortunately, many of them are still 
there.”32 According to the head of the National Union of Tunisian Journalists, 
Najiba Hamrouni, local journalists confront a dual struggle. “They are fac-
ing the authority of the owner of the media outlet or the editor who used to 
be followers of the regime, as well as the problem of public opinion accusing 
them of being responsible for the corruption of the media and partners in it.”33
Months after the Tunisian revolution, newly acquired 
freedom appears more of a burden than a gift for the 
country’s journalists. They are still left to wonder how this 
freedom should be interpreted and how editorial decisions 
should be made. State television reporter Amira Arfaoui 
describes the editorial limbo that was felt inside the public 
channel after the departure of Ben Ali, explaining that the 
staff was reluctant to make any decision that could pro-
voke unpredictable reactions on the street. This hesitation did not last long, 
however, as journalists soon began to do what they knew best—flattering 
political power. Before the revolution, “power” meant the Ben Ali regime. 
But at that moment, “power” meant the army, the people, and the resistance. 
As Arfaoui comments, “we used to be the trumpet of the regime. We did not 
have the choice and now [that] we find ourselves the trumpet of the people, 
we also don’t have the choice.”34
What the Industry Needs
The recent opening-up of the Tunisian media industry attracted vast interna-
tional interest in training for local media professionals. According to journal-
ist Hanene Zbiss, this training was crucial in introducing an understanding of 
basic journalistic ethics and practices, such as cross-checking sources and the 
distinction between news and opinion. 
Although beneficial in boosting journalists’ capacity, this training was not 
properly tailored to the particular needs of Tunisian journalists inheriting a 
culture of subservience to political power. Nor did it address specific problems 
created by an obsolete infrastructure and media practices. According to the 
head of the Union for Young Journalists, Abdel Raouf Bali, “the same training 
sessions were open to all sorts of journalists. For example, journalists covering 
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sports were invited to training on political journalism. They just wanted to fill 
the sessions, to implement their programs.”35 
Moreover, it seems that old “journalistic instincts” die hard. As Hossam 
Eddine Hamad, reporter at Radio Shems describes, “mistakes of subjectivity” 
are not easily defeated. “I always commit mistakes of subjectivity,” he says. 
“For example, I intervened in a live debate to respond to a listener who was 
expressing some views I [didn’t] like. The editor in chief asked me to be vigi-
lant against such mistakes.”36 
The liberalization of the media sector will also be impossible without 
reviewing the working conditions of Tunisian journalists. The quality of the 
content has never been a priority for those journalists whose main goal was 
simply enduring unbearable circumstances. Most Tunisian 
journalists had to wait many years before securing an 
employment contract, while many others worked as free-
lancers and were paid poor wages per piece. All were sub-
ject to firing at any moment. Winning decent contracts 
that allow journalists to enjoy decent salaries and job secu-
rity therefore remains a major challenge. 
The professional status of journalists is defined by agreements devised by 
the former regime to lay out the salaries and functions of different media 
workers, mainly in the print media. Those agreements were accepted by own-
ers of media outlets; however, they were never implemented. Under the Ben 
Ali regime, the government would subsidize what were called “training con-
tracts,” providing journalists with an opportunity for employment while they 
were paid in part by the government. In theory, these contracts should last no 
more than a year; but in reality, management would renew contracts on the 
basis that the trainee journalist needed continued coaching. This practice led 
to a situation in which journalists worked for years under precarious, short-
term contracts, earning poor wages and facing the threat of imminent firing. 
Journalists finally launched their own “revolutions” for decent working con-
ditions inside newsrooms and against owners of media outlets—a battle that 
will not be won easily. 
This internal revolution could be the most challenging struggle for journal-
ists because the owners of private media outlets are still reluctant to review 
the poor working conditions of their staff. The National Union of Tunisian 
Journalists is also fighting to win the right to represent journalists in negotia-
tions with owners in the media industry. Its effort is led by the General Labor 
Union, which represents workers in all industries. The amelioration of these 
poor working conditions will require journalists’ solidarity and for them to 
form a lobbying body under a unified banner.  
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Conclusion
In its most recent Press Freedom Index (2011–2012), Reporters Without 
Borders rated Tunisia 134, up from 164 in the previous ranking. The media 
watchdog praised “the end of the harassment of journalists by the Zine el-
Abidine Ben Ali regime, the emergence of real pluralism of opinion in the 
print media and, albeit possibly only for the time being, the end of massive and 
systematic Internet filtering.” However, the report also notes that “the recent 
appointments of persons with links to the old regime to run the state-owned 
media underscored the danger of a return to the past.”37
The newfound freedom of expression permitted by Tunisia’s post- 
revolutionary environment is not unique in the history of the country. Several 
short periods of political openness have in the past allowed the Tunisian media 
to enjoy the luxury of criticizing the regime. However, this liberty was later 
revealed to be a tool for appeasing socioeconomic tensions, usually kept under 
wraps by a complete media blackout. 
In its final report, INRIC condemns the reluctance of the new government 
to adopt new media laws. It deplores the lack of “objective, transparent and 
fair rules for the appointment of executives to head the public media, the 
alarming increase in attacks against journalists and attacks against press free-
dom, and their attempts to take in hand the public media.”38 But beyond the 
political will of the transitional regime, there are crucial challenges facing the 
industry, primarily those relating to its ability to become more professional.
The crucial task is now to investigate the real impact of this new media 
liberalization: Will it lead to a solid, independent media, rooted in professional 
and responsible journalism? Or will this new spring vanish 
and be replaced by a winter of agenda wars in the media? 
Some of the earlier challenges and dangers remain promi-
nent—namely, the appetite of the new rulers for using old 
mechanisms of media control, as well as the inability of 
journalists to distance themselves from belligerent political 
agendas. Journalists must transcend the former definition 
of their role as simple messengers of government policy. A 
lasting renaissance of the Tunisian media requires vigilance on the part of the 
media community itself, and an awareness of its role as the barometer of the 
country’s new democracy.
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